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‘Sir Arthur Hirtzel and the Pax Britannica in the Middle East’
John Fisher
Creative and Cultural Industries, University of the West of England, Bristol, UK
ABSTRACT
Sir Arthur Hirtzel, the long-serving senior official in the India 
Office was an old – and a much respected – Middle Eastern 
hand. Few in Whitehall could rival him in his capacity ‘to get into 
the mind of the man at the other end of the line.’ Surprisingly, 
perhaps, Hirtzel never visited the region and never set foot in 
India, with which he was so intimately connected in an official 
capacity. As this examination of his role during the First World 
War and its immediate aftermath shows, Hirtzel’s perspicacity 
concerning key political and military developments, as well as 
the opportunities and the constraints presented by the war, was 
striking. Notable was his percipience in predicting the import of 
Wilsonian idealism for Britain’s ambitions in the wider Middle 
Eastern region. So too was his ability to adapt policy to the 
changing international environment. He also foresaw the con-
siderable difficulties, especially financial pressures, which would 
arise in Iraq and affect British control there.
In a tribute to Sir Arthur Hirtzel, following the latter’s death, in January 1937, 
at the age of 66, the revered Middle Eastern hand, Sir Percy Cox, noted his 
‘exceptional capacity . . . to get into the mind of the man at the other end of the 
line.’1 Surprisingly, perhaps, Hirtzel never visited the region and never set foot 
in India, with which he was also intimately connected, in an official capacity, 
throughout his distinguished career at the India Office. Holidays were spent at 
his birthplace, Minehead in Somerset, or in Cornwall, where his mother lived. 
His acuity in dealing with Britain’s eastern interests instead derived from his 
capacity to build close relations with these fore-mentioned men on the spot 
and, where necessary, to shape their thinking in order to achieve the broader 
policy objectives which he helped to fashion. His mastery of British interests in 
the Middle East also stemmed from extensive reading and a prodigious work 
ethic, which also sustained him as a classical scholar, both as an undergrad-
uate, at Trinity College, Oxford, and in later life. His profound Christian faith, 
and a connected and equally strong belief in the benefits afforded by the Pax 
Britannica, and of the concomitant need to avoid any erosion of its prestige, 
also provided a solid foundation for his career. So too did the sometimes- 
Machiavellian cast of his mind, which found fertile ground in the 
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opportunities created by the First World War. Having entered the India Office 
in 1894, he served successively as private secretary to the Parliamentary Under 
Secretary (the 4th Earl of Onslow), to the Permanent Under Secretary (Sir 
Arthur Godley), and, from 1903, to successive secretaries of state (St John 
Broderick and Viscount Morley). Hirtzel considered these appointments for-
mative: upon his appointment as Permanent Under Secretary, in 1924, he 
observed that ‘Godley taught me some of the art and Morley some of the 
philosophy.’2 In fact, but for office politics, the mantle of the under–secretary-
ship might have been conferred upon him somewhat earlier.3
However, Hirtzel made his mark at an earlier stage when entrusted with 
crafting India Office policy towards Mesopotamia and the Middle East, more 
broadly, during and immediately after the First World War. He did so, 
successively, as Secretary of its Political and Secret Department (1909–17), 
and then as its Assistant Under Secretary (1917–21), and Deputy Under 
Secretary (1921–4). Then, he was supported, or led, by several other, very 
able, colleagues: notably his effective deputy, (Sir) John Shuckburgh, who 
subsequently moved to the Colonial Office; and his superior, Sir Thomas 
Holderness (Permanent Under Secretary, 1912–19); as well as by 
Parliamentary Under Secretary (1915–19) Lord Islington. However, it was 
Hirtzel’s voice which emerged most clearly, particularly in internal discussions 
within the India Office, in dealings with other government departments, where 
he was also held in high regard, and with officials on the spot. Tall, erect, with 
a handlebar moustache, fiercely intelligent, a seasoned but discriminating 
forward thinker, and unceasingly vigilant, where the safeguarding of 
Britain’s eastern interests was concerned, Hirtzel’s career deserves further 
scrutiny.
Like many of his colleagues, Hirtzel was acutely aware of the dangers 
attending war between the British and the Ottoman Empires. Amid evidence 
of anti-Entente feelings in the Persian Gulf, in the autumn of 1914, he strongly 
endorsed the increase of British naval power there and was otherwise closely 
involved in seeking to establish the loyalties of local sheikhs, in allaying their 
concerns aroused by that naval presence, and in seeking to prevent those 
sheikhs from playing off Britain against Turkey.4 An inescapable problem, 
he noted in November 1914, was that the Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, 
had undertaken to settle the Turkish question, including the Straits and 
Constantinople, in conjunction with Britain’s ally Russia; the concomitant of 
that being that Russia would secure Constantinople. Other than repeating the 
fact that Britain was at war with Turkey, rather than with Islam, or with the 
Caliphate, there was, Hirtzel felt, little else to be done.5 Hirtzel’s assiduity, in 
avoiding any perceived slight to, or interference in, Islam was a hallmark of his 
career.6 For similar reasons, he considered inducing Persia to join the war 
against Turkey, as immoral and likely to outrage Indian feeling.7 In fact, 
concerning Indian sentiment, evidence suggests that Hirtzel was broadly 
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reassured by intelligence received at the start of the war with the Ottoman 
Empire.8 He was also sensitive to Christian feelings. He deprecated sugges-
tions, at the outbreak of the eastern war, of removing the Caliphate to 
Palestine, which, to most Christians would simply be sacrilegious.9 His refer-
ence, in 1919, to the British Empire as a means of securing mankind’s 
redemption, was not simply rhetoric. As with some other British officials 
and statesmen, the roots of his wartime policies lay in profoundly held 
Christian beliefs and a vision of the resuscitation of the cradle of civilisation, 
under British auspices, as a moral responsibility ‘to humanity and 
civilisation’.10
The extent and nature of Hirtzel’s ambitions concerning Mesopotamia had 
begun to emerge early in the war, as the Anglo-Indian ‘Force D’ commenced 
its operations there, and as the Government of India, which directed the 
campaign, gave expression to ideas about Mesopotamia’s political future. It 
fell to Hirtzel, as head of the Political and Secret Department of the India 
Office, to contemplate the political and strategic implications of Britain’s 
military fortunes in Mesopotamia. Amid calls for a British protectorate 
there, notably from Lord Inchcape, the British shipping tycoon, who was 
anxious to recommence commercial activity in Mesopotamia, which had 
been halted by the war, Hirtzel cautioned restraint. Admittedly, Hirtzel con-
sidered a temporary eventual occupation of the capital city of Baghdad to be 
essential, not least for bargaining purposes, and as the natural corollary of the 
invasion of any country.11 However, more generally, and irrespective of British 
military gains in Mesopotamia, Hirtzel argued that its future would be dictated 
on the Western Front and, by inference, at a peace conference induced by the 
fortunes of war there, rather than upon any subsidiary front. This was in 
February 1915, at a time when Force D was held up and badly in need of 
reinforcements who idled in Egypt. The danger, Hirtzel noted, was that failure 
to redeploy these men, resulting in losses in Mesopotamia, could only fuel 
Jehad, at a time when the situation in neighbouring Persia was precarious.12 
There was certainly much negative thinking, especially within India, to sup-
port Hirtzel’s point but, over time, he also came to see, in the threat of Jehad, 
a means of supporting more ambitious aims in Mesopotamia, and of dispelling 
notions of British weakness.13 Connected to this, there was the possibility that 
retreat in Mesopotamia would facilitate the enemy’s military inroads into 
Persia and Afghanistan. German agents had followed in the wake of pre-war 
commercial penetration and were intriguing energetically, seeking to subvert 
Britain’s position in India, and to compel a diversion of scarce resources. 
Accordingly, partly in order to shore up British prestige, both Hirtzel and his 
colleague, John Shuckburgh, backed the ‘bolder course’ of attempting (unsuc-
cessfully, as events transpired) to advance upon Baghdad in October 1915. The 
failure of this effort, as Hirtzel noted, was a severe set-back for British ambi-
tions in Mesopotamia.14 In order to thwart the pan-Islamic threat, which his 
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superior, Sir Thomas Holderness, viewed with scepticism, Hirtzel argued in 
May, and then again in September, 1916, that Britain must resume the 
offensive, but on a larger scale than before.15 In the former instance, he was 
challenging an instruction from the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, 
General Sir William Robertson, concerning Lieutenant-General Sir Percy 
Lake’s forward position in Mesopotamia. Briefly, it afforded Lake latitude to 
fall back, something which the incredulous Hirtzel argued, in a forthright and 
sarcastic minute, would reverberate across the East, and with Britain’s Allies, 
to its detriment:
We do not, it seems to say, care about what may happen in Persia or India. We do not 
attach any importance to beating the Turk [Why not make peace & have done with it?] 
Our natural instinct is to run away. But unfortunately there are the Russians – misguided 
people who advanced rashly in response to our appeal to them to help us, & who are now 
simple-minded enough to ask us to help them. We must make a pretence of doing 
something. If therefore the Turk is sufficiently weak, fight him; but your own skin is the 
first consideration.
This may be good strategy, but it is not the way alliances are strengthened, nor will it 
assist us in the game of bluff by which peace is maintained on the Indian frontier.16
When challenged by the Secretary of State for India, Austen Chamberlain, 
Hirtzel explained his view more fully, earning not only Chamberlain’s praise 
but that of Parliamentary Under Secretary, Lord Islington, also. The nub of the 
issue concerned Robertson’s western preoccupation and the implied neglect of 
the need to secure a ‘permanent peace’ for Britain in Asia: something to which 
Hirtzel, and several other strategists and statesmen attached great 
importance.17 In Hirtzel’s opinion, that could only be achieved by means of 
Britain inflicting a convincing military defeat upon Turkey, an aspiration 
which Holderness suggested confused the desirable with the essential.18 
Furthermore, Hirtzel added, such a peace would require the permanent break- 
up of the Ottoman Empire, as the cornerstone and land-bridge of Germany’s 
Weltpolitik. Anything else, including Turkey’s defeat by Russia or France, 
could only undermine British prestige, not only among Muslims but also 
with Japan, whose ambitions in the Middle East the India Office viewed with 
concern. As Hirtzel warned, ‘The war with Turkey was thrust upon us pre-
cisely because the Germans realised its vital importance to us, & we shall come 
to serious grief if we attach less importance to it, & to its ultimate results, than 
they do.’19 Indeed, as Hirtzel noted, the operations in Mesopotamia had 
preoccupied five or six divisions and, even then, Russia’s help was required 
in northern Persia.20
When seeking to construct a forward–thinking consensus regarding 
Mesopotamia, Hirtzel came to rely upon (Lieutenant-Colonel Sir) Arnold 
Talbot Wilson during the latter’s time as acting civil commissioner in 
Mesopotamia (1918–20). Wilson had shown his true colours early in the 
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war. In November 1914, he spoke of the annexation by Britain of 
Mesopotamia as a solution for some of India’s problems, especially the settle-
ment of its excess population, notably in the Punjab.21 Wilson’s approach to 
making his views on this matter known (a letter to Colonel Arthur Yate) 
reflected his strain of forward thinking. The manner of its transmission 
resonated with Wilson’s indiscretions later in the war, and in its aftermath, 
when he inspired letters to The Times, vilifying War Office profligacy in 
Mesopotamia. Wilson had not marked the letter to Yate personal and private. 
His superiors dismissed the suspicion that he had divulged secret information 
but Hirtzel noted Wilson’s desire to bring outside influence to bear. Then, 
Hirtzel, who found the letter ‘interesting . . . but not the fruit of mature 
reflection’, sympathised with its underlying urges, at one level, although he 
was a powerful opponent of ‘Indianising’ Mesopotamia.22 Harnessing 
Wilson’s ‘excess of zeal’ presented Hirtzel with various challenges thereafter, 
in correspondence which was conducted both officially and privately.
A further important element in Hirtzel’s strategy was the perceived inter-
dependence of Mesopotamia’s vilayets or provinces. This became a valuable 
tool, in his hands, when building a case for the retention of further territory. In 
late March 1915, Hirtzel commented on the need to annex the Baghdad 
Vilayet, because its fortunes were so intimately connected with those of the 
Basra Vilayet. The security of Mesopotamia’s oil fields reinforced this ratio-
nale. However, a looser hold over Mosul and Aleppo then seemed appropriate 
because connections between those places and the Baghdad Vilayet were less 
manifest.23 When commenting on this, the then Secretary of State for India, 
the Earl of Crewe, fleshed out Hirtzel’s thinking, noting that the boundaries of 
British acquisitions would have to be defined, not simply by what Britain 
wanted to retain but by what it intended others not to possess.24
The nature of Hirtzel’s ambitions concerning the Middle East were also 
revealed at the time of the interdepartmental De Bunsen Committee, estab-
lished by prime minister, Herbert Asquith, in March 1915, under Sir Maurice 
de Bunsen, to outline Britain’s post-war territorial desiderata in the region. 
Hirtzel, like the Secretary of State for War, Lord Kitchener, envisaged 
a significant new British territorial edifice, with a forward line stretching 
from northern Mesopotamia to Alexandretta on the Mediterranean coast.25 
Both men found it necessary to restrain those urges although Hirtzel disagreed 
profoundly with one option considered by the committee, which afforded 
France a wedge of territory stretching from the Mediterranean seaboard to 
the Persian frontier, and which included the Mosul Vilayet. A year later, by 
which point Hirtzel contemplated Russia’s dwindling power, he argued that 
the rationale for those French gains had disappeared, but, again to his annoy-
ance, such concessions to France were in the process of being formalised in the 
Sykes-Picot Agreement. Unless Britain were to be confronted by a Russian- 
German combination, then Hirtzel viewed intervening French territory as 
DIPLOMACY & STATECRAFT 267
superfluous. For the purposes of peace, Hirtzel added, Britain should ‘make up 
our minds to live alongside of Russia & make the best of her.’26 His mind had 
been moving in this direction for some time. In March 1915, his sketch of 
potential British gains in the Middle East presupposed Russia acquiring 
influence in Armenia and Kurdistan. He acknowledged the failure of the 
neutral zone in Persia, created by the Anglo-Russian Convention of 
August 1907, counselled against giving Russia too much in that zone, having 
displayed much suspicion concerning its motives before the war; and in 
August 1915, argued for joint British and Russian control of Persian 
administration.27
A further, and rather important, hindrance concerning British strategy, and 
one which left Hirtzel ‘aghast’, was the undertakings given by Sir Henry 
McMahon, High Commissioner in Cairo, to Sharif Hussein of Mecca, in the 
so-called McMahon-Hussein Correspondence.28 The India Office was rather 
side-lined in the discussions prior to the correspondence and Hirtzel felt 
uncomfortable with what had occurred. Bargaining with Hussein, or supposed 
intermediaries, seemed fraught with hazards, whatever the outcome of the war 
and of the Arabs’ efforts.29 That conviction strengthened as further detail of 
the correspondence became available: Hirtzel was convinced that McMahon 
had over-stepped the mark in his ‘assurances’ to Hussein. If realised, the 
independent Arab state vouchsafed would encompass the Basra and 
Baghdad vilayets. Sir Edward Grey suggested that the Arab state would not 
materialise, but, nevertheless, Hirtzel felt that Britain would end up ‘eating 
some very indigestible words.’30 Hirtzel also considered the connected idea, of 
moving the Caliphate, and bestowing it upon Hussein, as premature. He 
argued that Indian Muslims did not want it, and should an anti-war revolution 
occur in Turkey, they would back the Sultan.31 He shared the Government of 
India’s scepticism about creating a strong Arab state proximate to key British 
interests, when it might become more hostile towards those interests than 
Turkey, as well as a seedbed for pan-Islamism, and was profoundly sceptical of 
the Arabs’ capacity for self-government.32 By extension, then, and after the 
war, he counselled against policies which might give implicit recognition to 
Muslim unity, across the Middle East and in India. The fact that Arabs had 
shown themselves incapable of running an independent state removed any 
practical danger but as Britain chose to maintain the illusion, in creating 
a façade of Arab self-government, he considered it a disingenuous policy.33 
He also felt that Britain’s Cairene officials had overestimated Hussein’s ‘power 
& prestige’.34 Hirtzel’s concerns persisted in that regard but despite Hussein’s 
growing temporal and spiritual pretensions, he concluded that Britain would 
lose more by reneging on its pledges to Hussein than by abandoning the Arab 
cause, a view shared by others.35
In June 1916, Hirtzel pressed Arnold Wilson for information about 
Mesopotamia’s inhabitants. Was there the raw material for an administration? 
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Then, Hirtzel perceived that the Basra Vilayet might not be annexed and that it 
might instead become some sort of condominium, akin to Egypt. The vital 
point, he argued, was to maintain a forward momentum: the British 
Government was apparently oblivious to this requirement.36 It was essential 
to have such information to hand to avoid being caught unprepared. By 
January 1917, Hirtzel’s thinking had developed. When writing privately to 
Wilson, he suggested that public opinion in neutral countries, America espe-
cially, must be made to realise ‘that the dismemberment of the Ottoman 
Empire is necessary in the interests of humanity.’37 This notion had implica-
tions for the nascent British administration in Mesopotamia, in which Hirtzel 
was closely interested. As previously noted, from an early stage in the war, he 
cautioned against making it into an Indian district or indeed assuming that 
Delhi should control it. His superior, Holderness, had clearly stated that the 
deployment of an Indian force in Mesopotamia did ‘not signify an Indian 
conquest.’38 As time passed, and a need for civilian officers arose, Hirtzel was 
vigilant in preventing Indian practices and personnel becoming embedded in 
the administration. Furthermore, he held that new officers would not need 
Turkish but rather Arabic. If Britain’s new Middle Eastern dependency could 
not be administered from India, it would then comprise ‘the whole of Arabia, 
Egypt and the Soudan – a unilingual and unicultural area, from Sollum to the 
Turco-Persian frontier.’39 The administrative model would be the Sudan or 
Egypt and by the spring of 1917, efforts were underway to create a unified 
service for the Sudan, the Levant and Mesopotamia, overseen from London, 
not Delhi.40 By that point, troops commanded by Lieutenant-General Sir 
Stanley Maude had occupied Baghdad. Mindful of Britain’s stated policy of 
bringing into existence an independent Arab state, just prior to that occupa-
tion, Hirtzel had drafted a telegram to Maude, which cautioned against 
introducing into the Baghdad Vilayet, the direct administration devised in 
the Basra Vilayet. Instead, he warned, existing administrative machinery 
should be preserved ‘with the substitution of Arab for Turkish spirit and 
personnel. The façade must be Arab.’ British officers must act only as advisers. 
Soon, Hirtzel contemplated a new department in Whitehall which would 
oversee this emerging empire.41 Hirtzel perceived the risk, in any public 
declaration, of implying that Britain would remain permanently in 
Mesopotamia, north of the Basra Vilayet, or incorporate it into the British 
Empire, when that might not transpire. Henceforth, British policy was based 
upon permanent British administration of the Basra Vilayet and the idea ‘that 
the Baghdad Vilayet should be made into an Arab State with a local ruler or 
Government, but under a British Protectorate in everything but name.’42
However, the future was uncertain. Hirtzel had begun to contemplate 
Russia’s disengagement from the Allies. Where that would leave the Sykes- 
Picot Agreement, of May 1916, which had on paper divided up the Middle East 
between the Allies, was not clear. Equally unclear, was the implication of 
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President Woodrow Wilson’s mantra of no-annexation. Finding the means of 
maximising Britain’s presence in Mesopotamia presented challenges but phy-
sical control would be a starting point. For that reason, in May 1917, he 
bemoaned the failure, to date, to contact the sheikhs of northern 
Mesopotamia and those in the Jezireh desert. Both they, and the Kurds, 
must be energised to resist Turkey; the more so, given setbacks encountered 
on the Palestine front.43
***                                                              
Other possible flies in the ointment, besides Wilsonianism, were Britain’s 
ostensible allies, France and Italy, and Hirtzel was vigilant in this respect. 
Notable, was his determined opposition to the establishment in Basra of the 
Ottoman Bank, because of its connection with France. Concerns about its 
activities resurfaced later in the war in the Hejaz.44 Indeed, Hirtzel was 
sensitive to the activities of those powers more generally, in the Arabian 
Peninsula, an area of close concern to the India Office, because of long– 
standing agreements negotiated by emissaries of the Government of India 
with sheikhs on its periphery. From the outset of war between Britain and the 
Ottoman Empire, Hirtzel keenly desired to exclude both France and Italy from 
the Peninsula and deprecated indications of weakness on Britain’s part, which 
might encourage their ambitions. Accordingly, withdrawal of forces, as 
occurred at the Red Sea island of Sheikh Said, and failure to occupy others, 
such as the more northerly Farasan Islands, seemed mistaken, likely to 
redound upon British prestige, and to encourage French and Italian inter-
ference: an assumption which was proved accurate.45 Such also was Hirtzel’s 
view, when, in early 1915, Turkish forces, supported by the prominent tribal 
leader, the Imam Yahya, of Sana, crossed the frontier into the Aden protecto-
rate and, in July 1915, captured Lahej. Hirtzel demanded their removal; 
otherwise Britain would forfeit the loyalties of tribes within the protectorate 
and weaken its position among the Arabs, more generally.46 The erosion of 
prestige, and the anticipated impact upon the tribes duly occurred, and was 
exacerbated by the failed attempt upon Baghdad, in October 1915, and the 
withdrawal from Gallipoli, in the winter of 1915–16. Here, diverging opinions 
between the Government of India and the India Office, concerning how best to 
shore up British interests in this minor theatre, complicated policy. Early in 
the war, debate had occurred about whether Britain should support the Imam 
or his rival, the Idrisi Saiyid. Hirtzel was more sympathetic towards the Idrisi 
than some of his India Office colleagues. But his key point, concerning south- 
west Arabia, was that Britain’s position after the war would be badly under-
mined unless it demonstrated its ability to defeat Turkey on the spot. This view 
was shared, among others, by Lord Curzon, formerly Viceroy of India, and 
wartime chairman of various Cabinet committees focusing upon the Middle 
East.47 Failure to defeat the Turks militarily would mean that Britain would 
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not command the respect of the Imam or the Idrisi and that they would not 
accept British mediation. So, too, any prospect of weaning the Imam from 
Turkey, and gaining his support for Hussein of Mecca, was unfeasible. 
Hirtzel’s thinking, in this regard, was borne out by the fact that, while 
Britain subsidised the Imam, he persisted in unfriendly acts towards the 
Aden Protectorate. He was unlikely to turn upon Turkey so long as the 
Idrisi threatened him from the north. In August 1916, the Idrisi was unlikely 
to desist because of reports that Sharif Hussein intended to attack him.48 
These, and other, developments led Austen Chamberlain, the Secretary of 
State for India, to conclude that the India Office ‘was right when it said that 
Arab unity was a myth.’49 The same logic led Hirtzel to argue, in 1916, that 
Britain could not make peace with Turkey until it had defeated Turkey 
decisively in the field.
In the autumn of 1916, when the survival of (King) Hussein, of the Hejaz, 
was imperilled, and Britain could not spare troops, it seemed that France 
would come to his aid, notwithstanding its military commitments elsewhere. 
Although phlegmatic about this, at one level, Hirtzel recognised that French 
assistance could seriously affect British prestige in the East, particularly if, as 
seemed possible in late 1916, France alone was left to defend Hussein’s 
strongholds at Rabegh and Mecca.50 So too would France’s continuing inroads 
into the Hejaz. These pinpricks neglected its acknowledgement of Britain’s 
preponderance in the Arabian Peninsula, and could also only undermine the 
independence of an Arab state.51 That said, for much of the war Hirtzel argued 
that France should not be denied Syria, as promised under the Sykes-Picot 
Agreement. Notwithstanding occasional expressions of regret about France’s 
activities in the Hejaz, he felt that Britain must tolerate its involvement there 
up to a point. After all, Hirtzel contended, Britain had instigated that involve-
ment, in the form of an Anglo-French mission to the Hejaz. While France may 
not have contributed directly and significantly to military successes in the 
Middle East, Hirtzel noted, it had done so on the Western Front.52
As for Italy, Hirtzel disliked its interference in Asia Minor: not least because 
German domination of Italian finance would afford Germany primacy in any 
sphere allotted to Italy there.53 He was equally sceptical about its pretensions 
in the Trans–Caucasus. Upon reading of the proposal that it might be 
entrusted with the region, he reportedly thought it a misprint.54 Where the 
Arabian Peninsula was concerned, he considered its ambitions had destabi-
lised the Arabian coastline and exacerbated differences between the Imam and 
the Idrisi from the time of the 1911–12 Italo-Turkish War. Italy’s ambitions 
had instigated a pre-emptive British occupation of islands in the Red Sea, 
following Italy’s entry into the war, on the side of the Allies, in April 1915. In 
the same month, Britain negotiated a treaty with the Idrisi, which guaranteed 
his independence and his coastal territories from attack, but it was unable to 
replicate this arrangement with the Imam Yahya. This afforded opportunity 
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for Italian intrigues although, as Hirtzel noted, in August 1916, Arab dislike of 
the Italians worked in Britain’s favour.55 Hirtzel was responding to an Italian 
suggestion of a self-denying ordinance, which would apply to Britain and Italy 
in the Arabian Peninsula, purportedly to avoid further friction there with 
Britain. He pointed out that Italy’s interest concerned trade between Eritrea 
and the Red Sea ports on the Arabian Peninsula and it was especially keen to 
exploit commercial opportunities in the Yemen. Britain, however, was an 
established power at Aden and could not permit Italy to meddle in neighbour-
ing Yemen, especially, where the Imam had claims to tribes within the Aden 
Protectorate, as well as in the Hadhramaut, on its eastern extremity. 
Accordingly, while Hirtzel subsequently demurred at the notion of turning 
the Red Sea into a British lake, or of seeking a protectorate over the Hejaz, he 
did want Italy’s admission that southern and western Arabia lay beyond its 
sphere of influence and deprecated any suggestion that Britain might adopt 
a self-denying ordinance concerning the Yemen.56 Opening the door to Italian 
imperialism could only compromise Britain concerning McMahon’s under-
takings to Hussein in a way which would reverberate throughout the Muslim 
world.57
Vigilance, tinged with realism, was the essence of Hirtzel’s thinking about 
British interests in the Arabian Peninsula and the Persian Gulf, more gener-
ally. He shared Sir Thomas Holderness’s scepticism about the idea of Sir Percy 
Cox, Chief Political Officer of Force D, of seeking to exclude Germany and 
Japan from the Persian Gulf after the war by making it a ‘mare clausum’.58 He 
believed that a recognition of Britain’s predominant political position, embo-
died in various treaties, and a disclaimer, on the part of other powers, of such 
influence, would suffice. Extending the Pax Britannica, in this area, by offering 
Trucial treaties to inland chiefs, as counselled by the Foreign Office’s Arnold 
Toynbee, seemed unnecessary; but a watchful policy, concerning these vital 
lines of communication, was indispensable.59 Hirtzel considered any exten-
sion of Britain’s peacekeeping obligations ‘so alarming as to be absolutely 
prohibitive.’ This was partly because, as he noted presciently:
[s]o long as the Turk was a real danger, the Arabs disliked us less than him. But when 
once that danger is permanently removed, the balance of dislike will almost inevitably be 
transferred to us, and there will be a strong tendency on their part to minimise the evils 
and magnify the advantages of the Government which they no longer endure or enjoy. 
The less we have to intervene in their domestic affairs the better.60
***                                                              
Hirtzel’s suspicions of France and Italy extended to Japan also: not least 
concerning the possibility of it helping Britain in Mesopotamia, in late 1917. 
Curzon set out the case for Japanese deployments there at a time when an 
enemy offensive appeared likely to frustrate further military progress. India 
Office staff identified serious objections to the proposal, not least, as 
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Shuckburgh noted, that Mesopotamia was traditionally regarded as an Indian 
preserve, and enlisting Japan’s help ‘in fighting our “Indian” battles’ might 
inspire calls for Japan’s help in India itself.61 Once installed in Mesopotamia, 
Holderness argued, the Japanese would not leave.62 In logistical terms, Hirtzel 
considered their deployment there practically impossible but, more pressing 
still, were the political objections: namely, the negative impact upon British 
prestige, the fillip given to Japan’s position in the eventual peace negotiations, 
and the fact that it would simply add a further claimant, thereby drawing 
attention to Britain’s ambitions. Hirtzel also feared that pan-Asiaticism might 
lead Japan to support Turkey, rather than Britain.63
As the nascent administration in Mesopotamia took shape, under Hirtzel’s 
watchful eye, the clarion call of self-determination grew louder. Discussion of 
Mesopotamia’s future, in this regard, occurred following a speech by Lloyd 
George, on 5 January 1918, in which he mentioned Mesopotamia, along with 
Arabia, Armenia, Syria, and Palestine, as ‘entitled to a recognition of their 
separate national conditions.’64 The changed international environment 
appeared to render the Sykes-Picot Agreement out of date. In theory, British 
policy sought to create an Arab state though Hirtzel was sceptical, not least of 
King Hussein’s ability to govern it. It remained unclear if Mesopotamia would 
become a separate political entity and, were that to emerge, what manner of 
political infrastructure would evolve to support it. How might Britain man-
oeuvre itself so as to control it, without appearing to revert to outmoded, pre- 
war, methods? The envisaged British annexation of the Basra Vilayet now 
seemed unlikely, something confirmed by the Foreign Office’s, Lord Robert 
Cecil, when commenting on the matter of a proposed investigatory commis-
sion into political conditions in Mesopotamia. Consequently, Hirtzel pro-
posed that the Arab façade, of which he was the principle architect, could 
not remain simply a façade. Acutely aware of the general slippage in Britain’s 
position, as Wilsonianism took hold, he argued that much could be achieved 
by making commercial inroads before rival powers established themselves, in 
anticipation of the return of peace. Hirtzel explained his views privately to Sir 
William Clark, Comptroller-General of the Department of Commercial 
Intelligence, in late December 1917. Then, he noted that military operations 
no longer impeded action but that a new hazard had emerged, in the form of 
Wilsonianism, which might deny Britain political ascendancy in Mesopotamia 
after the war, and condemn it to vie for commercial advantage with other 
countries. As such, Hirtzel was eager to back responsible commercial activity, 
and administrative developments, which might afford Britain a head-start, 
notably concerning banking and navigation. He was, therefore, keen to ease 
the path for Lord Inchcape to recommence operations in both respects.65
Connected to that was the need to organise crucial sections of the admin-
istrative edifice to afford Britain a lead. This applied, for example, to the 
formation of an Agricultural Department, which Hirtzel was keen to initiate 
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(against the advice of Sir Thomas Holderness), following upon the recom-
mendation of two trade commissioners, so that it might study likely challenges 
on the spot and make necessary preparations for the post-war world.66 
Connected to this, at various points during 1918, Hirtzel, like Lord 
Islington, was keen that British firms and banks should be encouraged to 
begin operations in Mesopotamia, in terms of discreetly pegging out claims. 
This was against the more cautious advice of Holderness and Shuckburgh, 
among others, who feared incurring responsibility for protecting the interests 
of those companies if Mesopotamia did not become a British preserve, as well 
as accusations of having jumped the gun, by commencing operations and 
excluding rival foreign concerns.67
Such initiatives were also required in order to stymie the misguided efforts 
of various armchair experts, or ‘irresponsibles’, as Hirtzel termed them, who 
seemed intent upon interfering in official business. One of these was Mark 
Sykes, secretary of the War Cabinet’s Middle Eastern Committee, and co- 
author of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, who enthused about the idea of having 
America offer Britain a 25-year trusteeship of Mesopotamia.68 Hirtzel also 
bemoaned the ideas of the American historian George Beer. With the support 
of Lionel Curtis, among others, Beer hoped to popularise the ‘extremely 
dangerous’ idea, as Hirtzel termed it, of an Indian colony in Mesopotamia, 
and also the idea of inviting America to share the burden in the East, a view 
supported by Sykes.69
As Hirtzel cautioned Arnold Wilson, in March 1918, from his sick-bed, 
those on the spot must be acquainted with these international trends; similarly, 
officials in Whitehall should be aware of local conditions. He continued:
Entirely different currents are flowing now and we must shape our course to them if we 
are going to get what we want in Irak [sic]. The old watchwords are obsolete, and the 
question is how we are to secure what is essential under the new ones. The thing can be 
done, but a certain re-orientation is necessary. The ‘Arab façade’ may have to be some-
thing rather more solid than we had originally contemplated.70
All well and good. But Hirtzel had long perceived that an Arab government 
would require substantial British support. Pending a formal decision about the 
future of Mesopotamia, he held that every effort should be made to exclude 
foreign influences which might not feel inhibited by ideas about self- 
determination. Thus, he regretted a recent decision of Major-General (later 
Lieutenant-General) Sir William Marshall, General Officer Commanding, 
Mesopotamia, in which Wilson had concurred, to again prevent the Church 
Missionary Society from commencing its operations in Mesopotamia. Such 
missions, Hirtzel noted, could not be excluded. His personal support for 
missions aside, it was politically important that foreign missions should not 
make headway.71
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Also important was that the residue of War Office control, in matters 
pertaining to civil administration, must be extinguished. This was partly due 
to the well-documented evidence of its cumbersome practices, as well as its 
general imperviousness to considerations bearing upon the country’s longer- 
term political and economic development, rather than short-term military 
occupation. Incursions of the military into the nascent civil administration, 
from the summer of 1917, had irritated Hirtzel, who had elicited information 
on this issue from Gertrude Bell.72 This was partly because he recognised 
that the people of Mesopotamia would now have a significant role in decid-
ing their own destiny. It was therefore important to consider their material 
well-being in the interim, so that they might opt for British control. Hirtzel 
felt that Sir William Marshall and his staff were insensitive to such 
considerations.73 Maude argued (with War Office support) that, without 
the prospect of help from Russia, and with enemy attempts to retake 
Baghdad likely to occur, trying to combine the general development of 
Mesopotamia with the defeat of the enemy was attempting too much.74 
Subsequently, as that administration took shape, Hirtzel desired centralisa-
tion of key functions, such as agriculture and irrigation, in Wilson’s hands, 
and, indirectly, his own.75 As he had earlier stated, when despairing of 
a move to dispense with the services of irrigation expert, Sir George 
Buchanan, in the autumn of 1917, the future of Mesopotamia depended 
largely upon irrigation, river conservation and agriculture, and Britain had 
a responsibility beyond its direct imperial interests, for its revitalisation.76 
Wilson agreed and later furnished evidence that the Army had, by inepti-
tude, dissolved Britain’s reputation in the Basra Vilayet and that people there 
eagerly anticipated a civil regime.77
A further constraint upon Hirtzel, was the difficulty of communicating the 
India Office perspective. The wartime interdepartmental rivalries, and admin-
istrative confusion, which characterised this episode in British policy overseas 
are well documented. Hirtzel commented upon the issue in the context of the 
issuance of the Anglo-French Declaration of November 1918, which pledged 
British and French assistance in establishing indigenous governments in 
Mesopotamia and Syria.78 Hirtzel despaired that while Sir Reginald Wingate, 
High Commissioner in Cairo, had received a copy of the declaration, with the 
instruction to circulate it widely, no copy had been received at the India Office. 
This coincided with the receipt of the disturbing news of Woodrow Wilson’s 
intention to entrust the territories to which the Declaration related, to neutral 
nations acting as trustees. Hirtzel considered that the Declaration precluded 
annexation or any form of government not desired by the population of 
Mesopotamia. When drafting a telegram to Arnold Wilson, in late 
November 1918, he instructed him to seek support for a form of government 
which afforded Britain the maximum of control over administration for the 
maintenance of security and development of natural resources, pending the 
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institution of self-government. In a point subsequently challenged by Arthur 
Balfour, the Foreign Secretary, but endorsed by Curzon, Hirtzel insisted that 
direct communications between the people of Mesopotamia and President 
Wilson should not be permitted.79
In late 1918, as members of the War Cabinet’s Eastern Committee debated 
the future of the Middle East, Hirtzel urged the need for a statement of policy 
for the guidance of the British delegation to the peace conference. His impa-
tience arose partly from uncertainty about the choice of Arab ruler for 
Mesopotamia. The Foreign Office broadly endorsed T. E. Lawrence’s idea of 
a Hashemite prince, while the India Office, Sir Percy Cox, and Arnold Wilson, 
backed the Naqib of Baghdad, whom Cox had suggested in the spring of 1918, 
as a titular ruler, with real power vested in a British High Commissioner, 
supported by a council. The latter would comprise heads of key departments of 
state and representative members of the population: an Arab façade writ large. 
By mid-December 1918, a decision on that issue was seen to hang upon 
Wilson’s investigations of local opinion. Hirtzel was deeply concerned that 
Lawrence’s ‘hypnotic influence’ had given credence, in some quarters, to 
notions of several Arab states, under Hashemite rule, something which 
could not be reconciled with McMahon’s undertakings to Hussein.80 He 
further noted that Lawrence’s Hashemite solution would entail the imposition 
of a Sunni ruler upon a predominantly Shia population. This, in turn, he 
argued, would encourage an anti-British alignment of Sunnis and Shias and 
inadvertently foster pan-Islamic sentiment.81
A further concern for Hirtzel was the difficulty of keeping both the French 
and the Arabs on side. This became more acute following the Anglo-French 
Declaration of November 1918, when the incompatibility of their aims in Syria 
became more pronounced. Growing French suspicions of Britain’s ambitions 
in Syria, where its troops remained until the autumn of 1919, exacerbated 
matters. Hirtzel was concerned that Wilson’s forward policy in Mosul might 
antagonise France, before that province could be negotiated away from French 
control.82 Wilson might also provoke France to claim equal gains in Syria but 
Hirtzel insisted that hard-won British gains in Mesopotamia could not be 
forfeited to appease France. Perhaps that insight was the ‘salutary detachment’ 
which, according to Wilson, Hirtzel and his India Office colleagues brought to 
bear, when counselling him.83 Indeed, when discussion of a peace treaty began 
in Paris, in early 1919, Hirtzel firmly opposed any constraints upon Britain’s 
position in Mesopotamia.84 As he noted, in January 1919, whatever was 
decided relative to Syria and Mosul, France would pursue its interests deter-
minedly and Britain must remain vigilant.85
Vigilance was also required more generally where T. E. Lawrence was 
concerned. Hirtzel’s distrust of him was palpable in the context of discussions 
about the future of Mesopotamia, when he alleged that Lawrence had sought 
to convey the impression that Gertrude Bell supported him, rather than 
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Arnold Wilson, concerning the future ruler of Mesopotamia. Hirtzel was 
suspicious of Lawrence’s relationship with Faisal and was concerned that the 
latter was using Lawrence as a means of pressing his case upon the Foreign 
Office. Hirtzel claimed to admire Lawrence but felt that the Foreign Office 
‘made a bad mistake’ in admitting him to their secret counsels and sharing 
their papers with him.86 As Hirtzel recalled when writing to Curzon, privately, 
in June 1919, when he (Hirtzel) had been in Paris early that year, as part of the 
India Office section of the British delegation, he had tried to have Lawrence 
muzzled, and his ‘malign influence’ curtailed, but that no one would listen. 
Arnold Wilson faced an uphill struggle, in trying to smother propaganda and 
agitation inspired, according to Hirtzel, by Lawrence and Faisal.87 They, and 
Baghdadi officers, formerly in Syria, whom Hirtzel had previously identified as 
potentially troublesome, seemed likely to undermine the British administra-
tion in Mesopotamia.88 While Hirtzel, like various other forward-thinking 
officials, favoured the cancellation of concessions to France in Syria, especially 
in its interior, by August 1919, if not earlier, he argued that Britain must leave 
Syria as quickly as possible.89 The growing danger was that, as he had foreseen, 
Britain’s position in Mesopotamia might be dictated by growing nationalist 
sentiment in Syria, which the wily ‘politician’ Lawrence, whom Hirtzel then 
claimed to ‘mistrust . . . profoundly’, seemed to be orchestrating.90
Hirtzel was not the only British official to find the negotiations in Paris 
unhelpful and deeply frustrating. Inevitably, their tone compelled a watering 
down of deeply cherished ambitions concerning Mesopotamia. It soon became 
apparent that, at best, Britain would become a mandatory power there, 
pledged to maintain equal opportunities for all countries.91 That was true 
concerning a range of issues, not least earlier ideas about excluding rival 
powers from commercial activity. Accepting these changed conditions was 
difficult for those left behind in London. John Shuckburgh’s view, in early 
1919, was that Britain, having established that Mesopotamia did not want 
Abdullah (Lawrence’s preferred candidate for ruler), should be permitted to go 
its own way there.92 To Hirtzel, however, this might encourage France to seek 
a protectorate in Syria. Alternatively, it might lead to Faisal seeking American 
oversight of both Mesopotamia and Syria. Instead, Hirtzel argued that Britain 
could only devise some form of Arab government, which might involve, rather 
than alienate, Arab nationalists, whose anti-British sentiments might other-
wise soon percolate into Mesopotamia.93 These discussions then led to Arnold 
Wilson being asked to formulate a constitution for Mesopotamia, as an Arab 
state.
Hirtzel was also disappointed that in Paris, the specifically India Office view 
on Middle Eastern issues, was sometimes marginalised by the larger Foreign 
Office contingent, by the attendance in person of the Foreign Secretary, but 
also, as Hirtzel was frequently to bemoan, by the ‘amateur diplomatists’, not 
least Prime Minister Lloyd George. He resented the way in which officials, of 
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all departments, were side-lined by the ‘snap’ decisions of the representatives 
of the Big Four. Such instances included the decision to send an international 
commission to the Middle East, in order to establish the wishes of the people 
concerning their future, something which would inevitably delay considera-
tion of the Turkish treaty. Also, there was the decision to permit Greece to land 
troops at Smyrna.94 Concerning the commission, Hirtzel wrote Montagu an 
impassioned letter, noting that the connected delays would encourage ‘a 
ferment of agitation & intrigue’. Upon establishing that France was not wanted 
in Syria, he suggested that it might be offered to America, which ‘would 
indulge in administrative experiments, wh[ich] w[oul]d react unfavourably 
on our position.’ The only option then seemed to entice France out of Syria ‘by 
a sufficiently large bribe elsewhere.’95 Hirtzel was reluctant to do this: he had 
previously argued that Britain could not forfeit France’s goodwill over Syria in 
order to satisfy Arab claims. Rather, he noted, Britain must play ‘honest 
broker’ between France and Faisal.96 Hirtzel had also recently argued against 
breaking with France on the assumption that America would assume respon-
sibilities in Syria. He held that Britain must deal with France across the world, 
amidst Bolshevism and a probable recrudescence of German ambitions; and 
he feared, presciently, that America might ‘withdraw into their shell again, 
leaving us to bear the odium of disappointed hopes.’97
By early May 1919, Hirtzel sensed that, unless discussion were forced by 
events in the Middle East, Woodrow Wilson’s difficulties with the American 
Senate would probably delay consideration of the Turkish treaty, and with it 
any prospect of America assuming responsibilities in the Middle East, until the 
late summer.98 Decisions were required on many issues. One conundrum was 
the fate of the Assyrians, in whose future Hirtzel was keenly interested, but 
whose own delegation to the conference was hopelessly divided.99 Seen by 
some observers as the residue of the ancient Assyrians, the notion of establish-
ing them in a separate Christian state, on the fringes of Mesopotamia, was 
discussed in Whitehall in the latter part of the war, including at the India 
Office, where Hirtzel argued their case. When asked about their preferred 
destiny, according to instructions from the India Office, in late 
November 1918, “[a]ll classes of Christians’ in the Mosul Vilayet favoured 
direct British control.100 In January 1919, amid public concern about Assyrian 
refugees, Hirtzel and Shuckburgh discussed the Assyrians’ fate with Arnold 
Toynbee, of the Foreign Office’s Political Intelligence Department, and with 
the secretary of the Archbishop of Canterbury’s Mission to the Assyrians. 
Then, the notion of a separate state had been watered down to idea of ‘Assyria’ 
as a canton, either incorporated into a Southern Kurdish confederation or 
analogous to it, as an autonomous area within a Mesopotamia under British 
protection.101
By April 1919, Balfour doubted a separate state, and favoured ‘a rich 
measure of local autonomy under the Mesopotamian State.’ This was true, 
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not least because of the risk of impinging upon Persia’s integrity, where 
Assyrians also lived.102 However, all of these considerations depended upon 
the definition of Mesopotamia’s northern frontier, including the settlement of 
the Kurdish question. In early May 1919, Hirtzel noted that while he was in 
Paris, the American Delegation had expressed willingness to accept a mandate 
in Armenia, but wanted Britain to deal with areas to the south where Kurds 
predominated. Arnold Wilson demurred at the consequent extension of 
Britain’s sphere unless the post-war garrison was increased sufficiently. The 
conundrum, Hirtzel noted, was having to choose between controlling the 
Kurds or putting up with chaos on the norther border of Mesopotamia.103
After much internal discussion within and between the relevant authorities, 
policy in that regard was embodied in instructions sent to Arnold Wilson, in 
May 1919, whereby he was directed to foster an Arab state in Mosul, bordered 
by a fringe of autonomous Kurdish states, under Kurdish chiefs but with 
British advisers. This already complex issue was, in due course, rendered 
more difficult by the stiffening of Turkish nationalism and the incompatibility 
between Turkish nationalist territorial aims and such schemes for Kurdish 
states. By August 1919, Hirtzel had set out the case for an independent Kurdish 
state, preferably under a British mandate, but as time passed developments 
militated towards withdrawal from such extended commitments.104 The chal-
lenge was to avoid responsibility for maintaining a Kurdish state, while safe-
guarding British strategic interests in the region, notably against 
a recrudescence of Turkish hostility. Securing those interests seemed to 
require that the Mosul Vilayet should remain within Mesopotamia and so, 
as a result, would key Kurdish strongholds. Then, India Office policy appeared 
to support a free Kurdish state, standing beyond the mountainous country at 
the extremity of the Mosul Vilayet, within which would lie a central Kurdish 
area. The idea of a Christian settlement around Lake Urmia persisted but, as 
concerns mounted about Bolshevik Russia’s strategic intentions, some officials 
advised against encouraging the Assyrians’ return.105
By late summer 1919, Hirtzel perceived multiple challenges. Not least there 
was his disagreement with Montagu about Turkey’s retention of 
Constantinople. Hirtzel strongly favoured Turkey’s ejection partly because, 
as previously noted, he felt it would stymie resurgence of Germany’s 
Weltpolitik. He also dissented (respectfully) from Montagu’s impassioned 
view that Turkey should retain Constantinople because its ejection would 
upset India’s Muslims. Instead, he suggested that those Muslims should seek 
a spiritual head within India. Here and elsewhere he continued to argue 
against any policy which, directly or otherwise, accentuated the unity of 
Islam.106
Difficulties persisted in Mesopotamia as well, not least regarding his rela-
tionship with Wilson. In mid-August, Hirtzel commented on the appearance 
of Harry St. John Philby (I.C.S.) before the Empire Cotton Growing 
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Committee, in May 1919, something which Wilson had apparently engi-
neered. According to Hirtzel, Philby’s evidence alarmed even Wilson, as it 
might be construed as a definite offer to the committee of a monopoly over 
Mesopotamia’s cotton industry. These and other developments seemed to 
Hirtzel to highlight Wilson’s fundamental misapprehension about 
Mesopotamia’s future: he had failed to accept that Mesopotamia would not 
be governed like an Indian state but rather ‘as a bona fide Arab State, with 
British officials in the capacity of advisers.’ As such, he recommended 
encouraging private British concerns as the best means of increasing British 
influence there.107
In an extensive, private ‘homily’ of 5 August, Hirtzel tried at once to counsel 
and to caution Wilson. The competing claims of Armenians and Kurds 
presented ‘an almost hopeless tangle’, Hirtzel noted. Persian ambitions had 
also to be factored into this complex question. But Hirtzel was most concerned 
by Wilson’s apparent failure to accept the demise of the idea of 
a Mesopotamian protectorate and that he must seek to channel nationalist 
sentiment rather than quash it.108 It would be far better, Hirtzel counselled, in 
September 1919, to swim with the new tide. The people of Mesopotamia might 
desire British rule but policy should seek to educate rather than govern them. 
Wilson’s Indianising tendencies earned a mild rebuke from Hirtzel and, 
indirectly, from Curzon. Wilson, Hirtzel warned, must be ‘content therefore 
to keep the pot gently boiling.’109 This letter crossed Wilson’s response to 
Hirtzel’s homily. Wilson denied any knowledge of the idea of an Arab state but 
disclaimed any intention of playing King Canute. However, he was beset with 
challenges, and subject to criticism, not least from the General Officer 
Commanding, Sir George MacMunn, who was reluctant to facilitate the 
transition of key departments to civil control. Hirtzel was sympathetic but 
saw that Mesopotamia was at a turning point. Having laboured to bring into 
existence an Arab entity in Mesopotamia, amid growing indications of unrest, 
he was inclined to question the extent of its goodwill towards Britain.110 To 
India Office colleagues, he warned that Sir Percy Cox’s return was ‘urgently 
necessary’.111
Following the Anglo-French Declaration of November 1918, Arnold 
Wilson had consulted the people of Mesopotamia about their future govern-
ance. Their preference for continued British oversight was clear but the 
Foreign Office vetoed a declaration to that effect. The resulting uncertainty, 
in Shuckburgh’s view, had provoked suspicion of Britain’s intentions, unrest 
and sedition, and the murder of British political officers. Hirtzel agreed, and 
seemed to imply that the problem lay in Paris, and with the ‘amateur diplomat-
ists’ there, of whom Curzon also despaired, rather than with the Foreign 
Office.112 Admittedly, Curzon consulted the British Delegation about 
a possible announcement of Britain’s intentions, but he was ‘extremely curt’ 
and immovable when responding to the India Office; a reflection, perhaps, of 
280 J. FISHER
the Foreign Secretary’s own indignation at the handling of affairs in Paris, and 
his marginalisation in the decision-making process.113 In addition, and much 
to Hirtzel’s chagrin, Curzon continued to veto concessions to British concerns 
in the Mosul Vilayet, which was the alternative means of implanting British 
influence.114
Curzon continued to play catch-up. In February 1920, Hirtzel implied that 
he (who had not been informed otherwise by the India Office) had only just 
realised that the notion of constructing an Arab state with British advisers, was 
chimerical. Wilson’s policy had operated in quite the opposite direction, and if 
Britain were to leave, then not even a framework for such an edifice would 
exist.115 The relationship between Hirtzel and Wilson then appeared to sour: 
Hirtzel found himself unable to restrain the forward impulses which he had 
earlier sought to nourish. Wilson began to vest greater faith in John 
Shuckburgh’s counsel – though, admittedly, Hirtzel intervened, to defend 
Wilson’s record, against the criticisms of T. E. Lawrence.116
***                                                              
Hirtzel’s credentials for a leading role in the oversight of the Middle East in 
the post-war world were clear. His perspicacity concerning key political and 
military developments, as well as the opportunities and the constraints pre-
sented by the war was striking. Notable was his percipience in predicting the 
import of Wilsonianism relative to ambitious British strategies. So too was his 
ability to adapt policy to the changed international environment. He also 
foresaw the considerable difficulties, not least financial pressures, which 
would arise in mandatory Iraq, and affect British control there.117 However, 
in due course, the younger Shuckburgh was selected to lead the Middle East 
Department of the Colonial Office, created in March 1921. Hirtzel had rejected 
the post, but his suitability for such a role had previously been questioned 
because he was unwilling to travel to the Middle East and because he was 
considered too much of an India Office man.118 That was an important 
consideration because India Office influence in British Middle Eastern policy 
was already waning, something which Hirtzel was aware of.119 In fact, while he 
considered that the need for an infusion of Indian experience in Mesopotamia 
would persist, potentially for some time, Hirtzel had lobbied for a Middle East 
department which might relieve the India Office of the ‘intolerable burden of 
Mesopotamian affairs.’120 This view was perhaps enforced by his reservations, 
shared with some other officials, and ministers, about the interdepartmental 
approach to policy making in the Middle East, the flaws of which had been 
accentuated in wartime.121
By that stage, however, the post-war world had moved on in other respects. 
As previously noted, Hirtzel believed fervently in personal relations: notably, 
those established by him with the men on the spot, and, in turn, those 
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established by the latter with the people among whom they lived. He felt that 
the advantages of such communication would be lost with the advent of 
aircraft, as Deus ex Machina, and it was to air power that Churchill looked 
to command the new Middle Eastern edifice over which his department, the 
Colonial Office, presided.122 Admittedly, Hirtzel argued against a policy of 
scuttle – of leaving Iraq – and of maintaining high numbers of troops there, 
but it seems probable that for Hirtzel, a diminished role for the India Office’s 
Political Department had some attractions. Not least, as Curzon mentioned in 
October 1920, there was the fact that Britain now stood ‘at the foot & not the 
top of the ladder’ in Mesopotamia. The business of fashioning the rudiments 
of an independent state lay ahead.123
Further afield, Hirtzel’s continued vigilance, manifested itself in the spirit of 
a valiant rear-guard action relative to India’s defence. This was true concern-
ing Bolshevik military advances through the Caucasus, into northern Persia, 
and towards India. When these developments were discussed by an interde-
partmental committee, in January 1920, Hirtzel expressed a keen desire to find 
some means of retaining control over the Caspian Sea.124 The alternative was 
grim. He was also keenly aware of the possibility of a resurgence of pan-Islamic 
sentiment on the North-West Frontier, as well as the nefarious activities of 
other hostile networks in the Near East. That was at a time when the with-
drawal of a British mission from Transcaspia, whose deployment he had 
earlier supported, was discussed in the early summer of 1919.125 Partly for 
that reason, he was sympathetic towards the aims of the post-war vigilance 
committees established to monitor Soviet intrigues on the frontiers of India, 
the Middle East and beyond, in which context he cautioned against burying 
one’s head in the sand.126 This was true, not least, in Persia and Afghanistan, 
where he detected serious risk from Soviet propaganda, the effects of which 
required Britain to stand fast in the Persian Gulf.127 Hirtzel had long antici-
pated Britain’s withdrawal from the Gulf but, in view of these threats, the 
moment had not arrived.128 Solutions to these challenges were also sometimes 
difficult to identify but no slackening of his former vigilance was conceivable 
either if, as he predicted, German ambitions were to revive, or more immedi-
ately as anti-British intrigues in Mesopotamia eroded the edifice which he had 
worked so hard to construct.129
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